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 The long contribution of war gaming to military training, operational analy-sis, and military planning has been well documented by numerous authors.1 
War games have been used for many purposes, and there are numerous different 
methods and types from which to choose, depending on the stakeholders’ aims. 
For example, war colleges have used war games as an integrated part of their 
curricula as part of the experiential learning cycle.2 The Pentagon wargames to 
develop and test new doctrine and war plans. Think tanks have used war games 
to generate new insights. The respective interests of these different users of war 
games determine the focus of their gaming efforts.3
The focus of professional gaming has shifted over time from the kinetic so as 
to include wider aspects of confrontations beyond war fighting, such as nation-
al will, social media, economics, and the laws of war. Traditional wargame mod-
els have struggled to represent these factors adequately. Developed from the 
hobby-war-game space, the matrix game narrative wargame method has been 
discussed widely in the wargaming community of practice and the method is 
now in general use. It is timely and valuable for 
the wider professional community to apply some 
scrutiny to both the worth of the method and its 
challenges. This article traces the origin of the 
method, briefly explains how it works, then uses 
a case study of a game based on a confrontation 
short of war in the Baltic to highlight some chal-
lenges with the method. The article concludes 
with an assessment of the utility of the matrix 
game method for gaming current political crises.
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THE LONG ROAD TO NARRATIVE GAMING
War Gaming’s Infancy
War gaming first became embedded in military training with the Prussian 
kriegsspiel of the nineteenth century. These training games usually emphasized 
the operational movement and combat aspects of warfare rather than the political 
aspects of confrontations. These early war games could be seen as an engaging 
tool for communicating the combat experience of veterans to the next generation 
of soldiers. The games supplemented traditional teaching methods of lectures, 
reading, staff problems, field exercises, and so on. Junior leaders would make 
decisions within these games and then the umpires, who were veterans, would 
intervene with reflections based on their actual combat experiences in similar 
situations. The increasingly detailed kriegsspiel rule books attempted to codify 
the experience of such veterans so that the games could run in a realistic manner 
even in the absence of veterans as umpires.4
The Prussian war games clearly were popular in the late nineteenth century, 
as shown by their dissemination internationally. For example, members of the 
British Volunteer movement (part-time reservists) played these games on their 
own time.5 The games were effective at teaching a number of military skills, such 
The 25th London Cyclist Regiment playing a kriegsspiel variant, “Bellum,” at their London regimental headquarters. Traditional kriegsspiel had opposing 
teams in different rooms looking at their own maps. The umpires would tell the players in each room what they could see. Bellum kept the players in 
one room and used a simple screen between the two forces to conceal movement until the main battle commenced. The rules were also simplified so a 
game could be completed in a single training evening.
Source: Reproduced from Curry, The British Kriegsspiel (1872) Including RUSI’s Polemos (1888).
FIGURE 1
EXAMPLE OF KRIEGSSPIEL IN ACTION IN 1915
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as the delivery of orders, combat appreciations, map reading (the games used 
actual military maps), and tactical decision-making. However, the key weakness 
of these games was that if too many rules were introduced (so as to include as 
much of the detail of real combat operations as possible) the pace of the games 
slowed down, making them less engaging and reducing the chance to practice 
other military skills.6
Naval War Gaming
Royal Navy officers pioneered the adaptation of the concept of kriegsspiel to naval 
warfare. John Fredrick Thomas “Fred T.” Jane was the best-known “father” of na-
val war gaming, but his war game actually rested on foundations built by the pro-
fessional naval officers of the time. At the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) 
in 1873, Lieutenant W. M. F. Castle, Royal Navy (RN), presented The Game of 
Naval Tactics and the chair of the session, Admiral Sir Frederick W. E. Nicolson, 
10th Baronet, CB, prophetically said, “I cannot help feeling that, at present, we are 
only on the threshold of a very difficult and complicated question, which may, in 
the end, be extremely useful to the Naval Service in general.”7 A few years later, in 
1879, Captain Philip H. Colomb, RN, presented The Duel: A Naval Wargame at 
RUSI; then in 1888 Lieutenant H. Chamberlain, RN, demonstrated his Game of 
Naval Blockade at a RUSI evening session. Minutes of these meetings show that 
the audience of professional naval officers and academics examined the merits 
of these war games vigorously.8 In many ways, these early discussions of profes-
sional war games were exemplars of good practice; they assessed each game on 
its merits, applying such questions as “Is this game realistic?,” “Does it teach the 
correct lessons?,” and “Is it a cost-effective use of officers’ time?”
Fred Jane published his wargame rules in 1898 and the classic Jane’s Fighting 
Ships series of books was the world’s first wargaming supplement.9 The books 
classified ships using the naval wargame armor-classification system. The rules 
were sufficiently realistic to gain professional credibility and the British and other 
navies used them widely. They were useful for developing an understanding of 
naval tactics, in particular what happened when ships of the line closed for a sea 
battle. The war games taught other lessons; the model ships used helped to de-
velop ship-recognition skills, and playing the game helped teach participants the 
speeds, ranges, armors, penetration ranges, and the like of those ships.10 In the 
interwar years 1919–38, there was a general acceptance of war games as part of 
a naval officer’s mental equipment.11 The Naval War College’s war games’ impact 
on World War II combat is documented particularly well.12
The vast majority of these early professional war games dealt with low-level 
tactical warfare, typically focusing on the details of various weapons and their 
effects. Yet interestingly, some of these tactical games had important strategic 
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effects. One of the classic examples was the Western Approaches Tactical Game 
that Captain Gilbert Roberts, RN, ran in 1942–45. The game trained convoy and 
escort ship commanders in anti-U-boat tactics for the critical convoy battles in 
the Atlantic during World War II.13 Later commentary on these games presents 
them as a single game, but Roberts actually ran three types of games.14 The first 
was for operational analysis—reenacting, on the floor, recent U-boat attacks on 
convoys. Relying on the after-action accounts of the escorts, Roberts and his 
team worked out where the attacking U-boats could have been and then statisti-
cally worked out the best tactic to maximize the chance of catching the attacking 
U-boat.15 The second type of game was training—teaching escort commanders 
of various nationalities to apply these new tactics. The third type of game was 
strategic—a map game mimicking the actual Battle of the Atlantic, with the aim 
of establishing whether rushing escort groups (naval support groups) to support 
convoys under attack actually would work (it did).
FIGURE 2
A NEWSPAPER REPORT ON FRED T. JANE’S NAVAL WAR GAME BEING PLAYED IN 
PORTSMOUTH, U.K., IN 1903
Source: Reproduced from Curry, The Fred Jane Naval War Game (1906), Including the Royal Navy’s Wargaming Rules (1921). 
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Post–World War II Tactical Gaming
At the start of the Cold War in 1945, a succession of manual, then computer-
based, war games focused on training or developing better war-fighting strate-
gies. Many of the American games looked at a potential war between NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact in central Europe.16 Dunn Kempf (1977–97) was a game that 
used 1 : 300–scale miniatures and had been developed from a hobby set of rules. 
Units were expected to make terrain boards that looked like their training or 
deployment areas. Units could make a plan, play the war game according to their 
plan, modify it, and then deploy into the field to exercise over the very terrain 
over which they had gamed.17
Tacspiel (1966) is an example of tactical war games that were used for opera-
tional analysis during the Vietnam War.18 It played an important role in improv-
ing the effectiveness of U.S. Army counterinsurgency techniques. The Tacspiel 
FIGURE 3
WESTERN APPROACHES TACTICAL UNIT ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE WAR GAME (1942–
45) IN OPERATION
It was played on the floor, with the players who represented escort captains sequestered behind screens, which limited what they could see to just the 
playing areas.
Source: Imperial War Museum Collection.
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“games” typically took two days to play just thirty minutes of simulated combat. 
The analysts would examine a situation such as an American infantry company 
being ambushed, then look at all the evidence to identify the best response. This 
response then informed subsequent training and doctrine.19
The Introduction of Game Theory
Along with the various tactical games, there were developments into the new 
area of political-military (pol-mil) gaming. In the 1940s, John von Neumann and 
Oskar Morgenstern developed game theory to model mathematically the interac-
tions among rational actors regarding economic matters; it was later adopted in 
other decision-making environments, such as pol-mil gaming.20
For example, the advent of the atomic bomb in 1945 changed the nature of 
warfare radically. No longer could war be assumed to be a zero-sum game, in 
which the person with the highest score wins, such that the loss of a “chess piece” 
by one side necessarily would represent an equal and opposite gain to the other.21 
In chess, the aim is to win by achieving checkmate, regardless of how many pieces 
are lost in the process. Victory in chess is irrespective of the “casualty rate” among 
the pieces. In contrast, the major goal for each power bloc during the Cold War 
(1945–91) was to attempt to achieve as many political objectives as possible—but 
not at any cost. Both sides wished to avoid a nuclear exchange that threatened 
devastation far worse than any possible political advantage that could accrue. 
Here was a situation in which both sides could lose horrifically but could win 
only relatively marginally. Understanding such a situation required a new theory.
Game theory in its simplest form can be applied to a situation in which each 
of the players selects a strategy from a limited number of predefined options. 
Each option has been quantified as having a positive, negative, or zero score. 
Game theory teaches that a player must adopt the strategy that best maximizes 
his assured score, regardless of the other player’s actions. Game theory was the 
basis for extensive theoretical work and dominated academic thought on conflict 
throughout the Cold War.22
Gaming Political Confrontations
Some authorities considered game theory to be unsuitable for gaming pol-mil 
confrontations, particularly given the short time before a confrontation turned 
into all-out war. The American government’s answer in the 1950s was mainly to 
run strategic war games through the Joint War Games Agency of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. The agency was divided into three parts: the General War Division, 
which conducted annual games about World War III; the Limited War Division, 
which continually tested contingency plans for smaller conflicts, such as in the 
Middle East or Korea; and the Cold War Division, which was concerned with 
modeling high-level crises rather than actual hostilities.23
6
Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 2, Art. 6
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss2/6
 C U R RY  3 9
Andrew Wilson outlined the standard methods of producing crisis games in 
America during the 1960s. A team of subject-matter experts (SMEs), includ-
ing diplomats, created a fact book covering the combat potential of the forces 
involved and the relevant geography, as well as other resources. On the basis of 
these sources, the scenario was generated and the game prepared.24
Such games normally involved a committee of five to ten players represent-
ing each country. The teams did not represent individuals, so there was no 
role-playing of individual positions, such as head of state. Each committee col-
lectively made decisions in the best interests of the country it was representing. 
The American teams were expected to pursue whatever policies best helped the 
United States pursue its national interest, but other teams were expected to act in 
a way that reflected the U.S. interpretation of the national interest or ideologies 
of the countries they were playing.25
Over the course of three days, the committees spent four hours discussing the 
options, then outlined to the game director their plans for the next two to seven 
days of game time. The game director, using his own experience and advice from 
specialists, then arbitrated the outcomes of the different plans.
Such games were criticized for a lack of focus. Was the objective to practice 
the procedures? To test the effectiveness of different force mixes? To serve as a 
creativity exercise that looked at outliers? To forecast future outcomes? Or to de-
velop optimal political strategies? Such committee games also tended to produce 
nonreplicable results, as the actual process by which decisions were made was 
difficult to record and the group dynamics within each committee were impos-
sible to model.
These games also have been criticized for allowing too much scope for un-
orthodox behavior—players would become bored and do things merely out of 
curiosity, just to see what would happen.26 A structure was needed that would 
produce more-plausible behavior in games, but also would allow political and 
other factors to be integrated into the games. In addition, a new type of game 
was needed that could be developed faster, was flexible enough to game whatever 
subject needed exploring, and could be run within a relatively short span of time.
During the 1970s and ’80s, the wargaming hobby industry, in particular 
through the board game company Simulations Publications Inc. (SPI) and its 
magazine Strategy & Tactics, pioneered innovation in political gaming.27 Early 
examples included the following:
• The Plot to Assassinate Hitler (1976) attempted to game the preparation for 
and staging of a coup in Nazi Germany during World War II.28
• Canadian “Civil War” (1977) modeled attitudes toward separatism versus 
federalism during a time of political conflict in Canada.29 
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• After the Holocaust (1977) was largely an economic game about reconstruc-
tion following a strategic nuclear war.30
Many ideas developed subsequently became widely adopted to represent po-
litical issues in gaming.31  However, one generic wargame methodology made the 
leap from the hobby to the professional communities.
MATRIX GAMES
Matrix game methodology was created in the United States by Chris Engle and 
was first published in 1992.32 Engle aimed to create a system by which it was 
possible for a player to role-play at any level, representing anything from a single 
person to an entire country. Subsequently the method was developed extensively 
and play tested in a variety of professional military educational contexts over the 
next fifteen years. By now matrix games have been used for professional military 
education in the United Kingdom, including to study current conflicts, such as 
those in Syria, Libya, and Iraq, as well as hypothetical conflicts in such hot spots 
as the South China Sea and the Korean Peninsula.33 Those working in intelligence 
also have used them.34
Matrix games exist in the space between rules-based war games and online 
role-playing games. Many of the existing rules-based games take considerable 
time and effort to explain to those from a nonwargaming background. Rather 
than attempting to come up with rules to cover all possible actions, the matrix 
games are very light on rules. Players state what they want to do and what the 
impact of this would be, and give reasons supporting why their efforts would 
succeed. Other players then are allowed to suggest factors that would increase or 
decrease the chance of success. On this basis, the umpire normally assigns a prob-
ability to the chance of success of the players’ actions. This method encourages 
creative thinking but has a structure that uses the experiences of the group to help 
moderate the suggestions. Having a team represent and role-play each actor in 
EXAMPLE OF A MATRIX GAME ARGUMENT
Player A: “I will reassure the Baltic States of support by harassing enemy sub-
marines in the Baltic Sea. I am able to do this because: 
• I have three frigates deployed and available.
• The captains and crews are highly experienced in antisubmarine warfare.
• Electronic intelligence reveals the enemy deployment patterns.
• The weather is fine, so they can work uninterrupted.”
Player B: “But overt trailing guarantees that the submarines will detect the 
frigates and will take active counterdetection actions.”
Umpire: “I assess the balance of these arguments and I assign the follow-
ing probability of success that Player A has to achieve to obtain the desired 
outcome.”
The game world then moves on from that point and the next player pro-
poses an action.
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the game helps encourage analytical discussion; for each turn, the team is given 
a short time to agree on a course of action.
One of the strengths of matrix games is the ability to integrate pol-mil 
actions within a single game. Since players can make arguments about whether 
another player’s proposed actions would succeed, the game had some elements 
of both competition and cooperation. This method allows a situation to be 
explored quickly without the constraint of cumbersome game mechanics. Game 
designers developed many variations of matrix games, customizing them to 
their purposes.35
MATRIX GAME CASE STUDY: POSTURING IN THE BALTIC SEA
The scenario that follows was developed at the Military Operations Research 
Society (MORS) Emerging Techniques Special Meeting (METSM) in October 
2016.36 The intention of the effort was to examine the utility of matrix games for 
gaming an event of current interest. This formed part of MORS’s wider efforts to 
investigate the validity of professional war gaming.
The scenario subsequently has been played multiple times with different 
audiences, including members of the military, academics with relevant special-
ties, and wargaming hobbyists.37 Those in the last-named audience, if they are 
experienced in playing modern pol-mil games, can add value, as they sometimes 
think outside the box and propose original strategies that provide new insights.
Background to Tensions in the Baltic
While the United States often focuses on issues of sea power in the Pacific, the 
European countries of NATO focus more on the issues of the Baltic States and the 
threat from Russia. Russia’s agenda is to secure its place as a world power, and as 
such to be entitled to its own sphere of influence and the right to maintain buffer 
regions as part of its strategic defensive doctrine. Such a buffer would include 
adjacent states. Recent history demonstrates that Russia has the willingness and 
the ability to use military force, or the threat of it, to achieve its political objec-
tives, such as in Chechnya (1999–2009), Georgia (2008–14), and Ukraine (2014– 
present). Hence, the Baltic States of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania see themselves 
as being on the front line.38 To secure the republics, it is NATO policy to rely on 
the deterrent effect of trip-wire-size NATO forces that could be reinforced rap-
idly in the event of a crisis.
The region has the added complexity of the presence of the Russian exclave of 
Kaliningrad. Königsberg was an ancient medieval town and was the old capital 
of Prussia. At the end of World War II, Russia occupied the town and the local 
German inhabitants fled, were killed, or were expelled forcibly. The town was 
renamed Kaliningrad and became the year-round ice-free European port for the 
Russian Baltic Sea Fleet. Approximately four hundred thousand Russians live in 
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the area, largely providing the workforce to support the Baltic Sea Fleet and the 
two naval air bases. The area has staggering pollution problems, including by 
nuclear waste. Geopolitically, Kaliningrad is cut off from the rest of Russia by 
Lithuania and Poland, which are members of NATO. The strategic importance 
of the existence of the exclave is that the Baltic States are linked to Poland and the 
rest of NATO only by a sixty-five-kilometer land corridor to Lithuania.
The Scenario
One of the keys to a successful game is constructing an immersive narrative for 
the scenario.39 The starting point of the Baltic Challenge scenario is as follows: 
Russia has deployed nuclear-capable Iskander-M short-range ballistic missiles 
to its Kaliningrad exclave. The Iskander missile is dual capable—able to carry a 
conventional warhead or a nuclear one. But development and deployment of such 
a missile constitute a breach of the Cold War–era Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces Treaty of 1987.40 The missile’s range, perhaps six hundred kilometers, 
makes all the Baltic States and two-thirds of Poland potential targets. The missile 
FIGURE 4
THE GAME MAP FOR THE BALTIC CHALLENGE 
The map is populated with counters as narrative devices—visual aide-mémoire rather than accurate representations of military units. The choice of map 
and counters influences the direction of the game, as they provide a visual focus and a potential psychological boundary on which players can focus. 
However, the players can ask for additional geographical areas or units to be represented if required.
Source: Reproduced from Curry and Price, Modern Crises Scenarios for Matrix Wargames.
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is mobile and, despite the huge size of its launcher, hard to detect. Finally, the 
missile’s mobility, combined with the short elapsed time from order to launch 
and the fast flight time, means that Russia has a first-strike nuclear capability in 
the region. It is unlikely that a target state would receive any warning of an attack 
before the first missiles exploded.
For the purposes of the scenario, the Baltic States are alarmed and they ask 
NATO for assistance. This raises tensions within NATO.
The expectation in the game is that the conflict will remain below the thresh-
old of a general war. However, miscalculation, perhaps by a third party, could 
bring the situation to the brink of a shooting war.
The Play
Players are told that the game outcomes will be reported only under the Chatham 
House Rule, under which the contribution of individuals may not be attributed.41 
Removing any concerns about postgame reporting is important; it helps remove 
organizational constraints that might discourage players from experimenting.
The players read their briefing handouts, which include a strategic overview 
of the initial situation and personalized aims and objectives. Sometimes after 
discussion (at least two people represent each faction) the players suggest revis-
ing the objectives. Any such revision is done in collaboration with the umpire, to 
prevent players from inadvertently “breaking the game.”42 The dynamic of intro-
ducing more players into each role is a useful one, but it needs strong moderation 
to keep up the game’s momentum.
The game proceeds with each team making an argument, starting with the fac-
tion deemed to have the initiative. The amount of time that each turn represents 
remains abstract, but players in this game generally understand it to be a few 
weeks. As the game progresses, the role of chance means that the game does not 
proceed necessarily in the most likely direction but rather generates a potential 
future scenario. Conflict incorporates a degree of chance by its very nature, and 
the game reflects this. In one case a team argued that an operator on the other 
side fired a surface-to-air missile without authorization, but it missed. The out-
come of such arguments usually changes the future direction of the game. The 
matrix game narrative methodology promotes the creation of plausible actions 
within the structure of the scenarios.
Postgame Discussion—the Hot Washup
The academic evidence is clear that a major part of the value of serious games is 
in a well-conducted after-action review. Games can be viewed as a prelude aimed 
at stimulating high engagement and valuable focused discussion.43
An issue with an unclassified game is that it may produce outputs that could 
be considered of value to decision makers (on either side). If players, through 
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the focused lens of the game, identify actual weaknesses or develop successful 
strategies (for either side), the game outputs should be considered confidential 
and their dissemination controlled. However, excluding from pol-mil games 
those who do not hold the appropriate security clearance restricts the intellectual 
power that can be brought to the exercise. An example might be academics who 
possess specific foreign policy knowledge.
After game play concludes there is an hour-long discussion among the play-
ers and the umpire about the realism of the scenario and the actions taken in 
the game, including a postmortem of player actions. The umpire provides only 
minimal moderation; the players take turns posing questions to one another and 
questioning individual moves.
The purpose of playing the game is to create a realistic representation of a live 
potential crisis and to react as the stakeholders would in the real world. Players 
with relevant experience of such confrontations note that the game includes 
many activities reminiscent of the real world. For example, it might be seen as a 
rational player strategy to focus on achieving only a few aims, but the NATO team 
actions always consist of hopping from crisis to crisis.
One recognition—which arose from all iterations of the game and with all 
types of players—was that the majority of NATO doctrine and foreign policy 
work was somewhat lacking when dealing with the “gray zone” that falls between 
a situation constituting normal deterrence and a situation that reaches to article 
5 of the Washington (NATO) Treaty (invoking collective defense—an attack on 
one is considered an attack on all).44 This has led to a dawning of understanding 
that the NATO players often are unsure of what they should be doing and how 
the opposition will interpret their actions. Of course, one must be careful of mak-
ing generalizations on the basis of anecdotal evidence, even from multiple game 
iterations; there certainly are policy makers in NATO who can deal with these 
issues. But the evidence from these games indicates that these experts’ under-
standing has not filtered down to those at the operational level.
Recently, some senior Western politicians have made comments along the 
line of “Treaties should not be straitjackets” and “Are we really considering go-
ing to war over a country with a population equivalent to two [U.K.] municipal 
boroughs?”45 Such comments have worried many professionals who had assumed 
that the Cold War certainties with regard to Russia still held firm. This particular 
uncertainty, coupled with the larger, manifest uncertainty about the actions the 
United States might take, has led to a number of iterations of the game by pro-
fessionals that mirrored the sort of radical alternative futures that recreational 
players have proposed.
The game has proved to be an extremely good way of ensuring that all con-
cerned develop a deeper understanding of the situation. Prior to the series of 
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games being played, one senior person (whose professional focus was not the 
Baltic States) looked at the proposed map for the first game and asked why some 
counters on the map showed the proportion of ethnic Russians in particular 
areas. This person then pointed to Kaliningrad and asked why so many Russians 
were living there—obviously completely unaware that Kaliningrad was part of 
Russia. Following the game, many of the participants remarked on aspects of the 
situation about which they were uninformed, despite intelligence briefings being 
disseminated on a regular basis. Games are effective devices for contributing to 
the learning process.
Another aspect of the situation was the vexed question of antiaccess/area-
denial (A2/AD) measures—powerful Russian weapon systems that threaten to 
deny easy access to the restricted waters of the Baltic.46 This subject has been 
written about extensively; but the game, operating in the gray zone, demonstrates 
that much of the rhetoric on the subject is flawed. As a player in one iteration of 
the game summarized, “A2/AD is a product of the imagination. We move into 
theater, and either they shoot us or they don’t. If they shoot, we are in an Article 
5 situation and we all know what to do; if they don’t, we just carry on. A2/AD 
doesn’t exist outside a shooting war.”
EMERGING THEMES FROM A GAME BASED IN NARRATIVE 
METHODOLOGY
Flexibility
Over many iterations of the Baltic Challenge game, the inherent focus on the 
narrative rather than the mechanics of war has led to the game play unfolding in 
a variety of ways.
• Realism was exhibited not only in the overall design of the scenarios but 
in how the players responded to the various crises. The reasoning exhib-
ited within the matrix game was natural in human terms, with models of 
negotiation focusing on the same type of variables that real-world deci-
sion makers would consider important in the crises and conflicts being 
simulated.
• Transparency of the game mechanics led to the logic of the game being un-
derstandable and humanlike in terms of the decision process and individual 
judgments.
• The narrative of the game allowed flexibility, with the overall conflict serving 
as a framework for a diversity of contexts representing alternative solutions 
to the conflict. It was possible to reflect diversity in larger strategies, value 
systems, perceptions, and competence.
13
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• There is an evolutionary potential to the narrative structure, using the initial 
setup as a highly simplified baseline for constructing more-sophisticated 
interactions.
• The ease of use designed into the game mechanics ensured that it was pos-
sible to review and adapt the game play without being proficient in specific 
modeling, programming, or game-design disciplines. 
Umpiring Challenges
Two umpiring challenges need further exploration. They involve the trade-offs 
involved in deciding whether to (1) keep a game on narrative track or let the 
narrative emerge organically, and (2) drive the game to a satisfactory narrative 
conclusion or encourage analytical discussion.
Player Inventiveness. The first challenge involves the need in matrix games to 
moderate player inventiveness. The essential trade-off is between allowing play-
ers to discover unconventional strategies that constitute so-called black swans 
and letting players explore the most likely options for each role.47 An example was 
the range of alternatives that the members of a Russian team explored for achiev-
ing their strategic direction of creating internal dissent within the Baltic States. 
At one end of the spectrum was the realistic, incremental approach: building up 
discontent over months with a carefully crafted social media campaign. But at 
the other end of the spectrum was the unlikely, but still feasible, idea of carrying 
out a surge, perhaps by disguising intelligence agents as tourists. In matrix game 
terms, an argument to achieve this would have needed a high score to succeed 
but would fall within the bounds of military possibility. However, such a success 
would alter the course of the rest of the game, with Russia having a strong body 
of controlled activists in the republics at the end of turn 1 instead of a number of 
turns later. If the game space is visualized as an ever-expanding branching tree 
network, occasional choices with a low chance of success can move the game state 
onto an entirely different branch.
When game play begins within a set construct, a series of tasks is assigned to 
each team and the members embody their roles within the session. To this point, 
the umpire retains control over the emerging story line, introducing new tracks 
as needed when situations arise. Conflict begins to occur when the narrative 
becomes a question of experience and opportunity, as occurred in the example 
above. When players of the Baltic Challenge game have had experience in war, 
politics, and government their experience skews the narrative, altering the nature 
of the game play in subtle and not-so-subtle ways.
Uneven teams provide an example. A team usually consists of two or three 
people, who may or may not have similar backgrounds. When the team has 
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representation from people of different expertise levels and dissimilar back-
grounds, the actions it takes tend to alter the nature of the narrative in big leaps 
rather than the small steps through which people with equal expertise would 
progress. In one instance, one team’s members argued that they would assert 
political control in a city in just one turn, whereas those with more experience in 
such matters countered with the suggestion that it would take multiple actions 
to achieve this outcome. Inexperience can underestimate the time and effort 
required to effect change in the real world. This led to the narrative refocusing 
the discussion as a means to explain game play rather than to move the scenario 
forward. In this instance the umpire had to intervene for the game to progress.
Alternatively, the umpire can create a narrative that is too constrained, where-
upon the game begins to break owing to a lack of player choice. For example, 
if the Russian player moves forces into a blockade position, NATO either must 
force the blockade and go to war or must concede defeat. If the teams in the con-
flict lack the means to create new actions, they are forced to rely on the umpire to 
introduce a new scenario that allows the teams to take action.
In sum, a balance needs to be struck between the organic growth of the game 
narrative and the immediacy of creating a playable game scenario in a realistic 
conflict.
Conclusion versus Discussion. The second challenge is deciding whether to 
drive the game to a satisfactory narrative conclusion or encourage analytical 
discussion. After players receive their initial briefings, the members of each 
team retire to a separate space to attempt to coalesce their understanding 
within the team and to speculate on the content of the other teams’ brief-
ings. In one instance, a team even started to map out the most likely path the 
game would follow by verbalizing a sort of miniature matrix game. One game-
management question is how long to allow this focused consideration of the 
situation to continue before bringing the teams back to the main event. By 
allowing the teams to confer beforehand the umpire creates space for dialogue 
not available during the actual game play; however, interchanges that include 
SMEs discussing ongoing real-world confrontations move from one topic to 
another, which may result in individual teams creating entire scenarios prior 
to the actual game play.
A review of the scenario is necessary when starting the game, but it can lead 
merely to more analytical discussion rather than to actually commencing the 
exercise. The game does not depend on the map being an exact representation 
of the daily movement of forces, but players who represent experts in the field 
want to ensure the authenticity of the experience by starting the game from the 
actual situation at the present time. When the game commences, engaged players 
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inevitably take the opportunity to question forces, geography, culture, and other 
salient factors. The umpire then has to judge at what point to intervene by mov-
ing the game narrative on and when to let the discussion continue because it is 
generating new and potentially useful insights. The narrative of a matrix game 
evolves constantly, and each scenario posed increases the number of actions the 
teams can take.
That is, unless a situation develops that brings a halt to most decision process-
es. In one Baltic Challenge game, the conflict situation developed until it became 
clear that there would be a major pause in the tempo of operations. Political op-
tions had been expended and some player teams were running out of ideas. An 
indication of this in some matrix games is when most teams are arguing for quite 
modest developments in their favor. An example of this would be the Nordic 
team having its civilian politicians carry out a political minitour to boost urban 
support for the government coalition. Such an action might be worth doing, but it 
is unlikely to move the narrative forward significantly. In such situations the um-
pire faces a choice: to halt the game and move into the hot washup / after-action 
review phase or to wait and see whether the pressure of inactivity will spur on a 
team’s creativity, leading to an unexpected strategic innovation that returns the 
game to a dynamic state.
Game play in matrix games requires a balance between analysis and narrative. 
The realistic nature of the Baltic Challenge, combined with the expertise play-
ers bring to the game, creates an atmosphere that spurs analysis of the situation 
more than action. This ongoing analysis makes it difficult to move the narrative 
forward. Teams often spend a large amount of time debating small actions, and 
the narrative stalls. While this may mirror the current situation in the Baltic, the 
purpose of the exercise is to game the situation realistically but at a quicker pace. 
One of the umpire’s greatest powers is the ability to end the game and move on to 
the hot washup. This option has to be wielded carefully, because calling a halt to 
all actions and declaring the situation complete concludes the narrative abruptly.
THE UTILITY OF NARRATIVE MATRIX GAMES FOR GAMING 
CURRENT POLITICAL CRISES
Matrix games serve an important role in gaming current and potential crises. By 
creating a space where key stakeholders can manage specific situations involved 
in controlling and predicting scenarios, there is room to learn about the thinking 
and maneuvering behind current world events.
While the matrix game methodology employs narrative to strengthen the game 
play, it also assumes a certain level of expertise in the subject being gamed. Pre-
paring a primer pack before the game is essential, and the effort involved in creat-
ing such a succinct summary can be a useful analytical exercise in itself. Further, it 
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is clear that issuing players a pregame narrative of background information helps 
provide the foundations onto which game play can be introduced. Players are not 
simply set to work on some prescribed aims and objectives; they possess a cultural 
overview that helps provide the basis for actions within the game.
However, it should be noted that there is some academic evidence to suggest 
that players from different cultures play in different ways. For example, Chinese 
players, and by implication Chinese decision makers, typically act in a more co-
operative way than their American equivalents.48 This implies that simply hand-
ing players a brief may be insufficient to replicate accurately the mind-set of those 
they are playing. Player recruitment may change game outputs, and each game’s 
lessons may be different depending on player backgrounds, even using the same 
scenario and ground rules.
Earlier players also noted the need for a practice session to allow those unfa-
miliar with the technique to practice the game methods, so this has been incor-
porated. Once everyone is familiar with the game methodology, the game clock 
is reset and the game itself commences.
Scenario design is critical, particularly with regard to the visualization, as 
represented by the maps and counters available at the start of the game. For 
example, adding refugee counters gives the game a more humanitarian focus, 
whereas introducing large numbers of military units tends to encourage the 
players to focus their play more on the kinetic aspects of the confrontation. In 
the Baltic Challenge game, Finland is only partially presented, as simply an area 
on the map, which limits the potential for players to conduct detailed play in the 
country. However, if the game starts to focus on Finland the inherent flexibility 
of the matrix game method allows the umpire to generate an inset sketch map 
of Finland on demand, thereby allowing the direction of the game to continue.
Certain types of scenario are more suited to matrix games than others. Would 
gaming a natural catastrophe work as well as gaming a counterinsurgency situ-
ation? Experience from the recreational use of matrix games seems to indicate 
that multisided games are more suitable than two-sided situations; the narrative 
of multisided games allows multiple stories to develop around the actions of the 
game. However, some apparently two-sided games might include multiple stake-
holders who are notionally on the same side but hold slightly different judgments 
about the value of certain aims and objectives.
The matrix game narrative methodology may prove to be a useful tool for 
examining complex scenario dynamics, in which strategies are not initially ap-
parent and the interplay of divergent multiple actors cannot be predetermined or 
reasoned out even with careful examination of the situation. Like all war games, a 
matrix game cannot predict the future, but it can lay out a narrative for a particular 
future scenario. Conducting multiple replays can generate more scenarios.
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However, it is clear that there are steps that can be taken to improve the poten-
tial utility of the method. Having an SME who is not participating in the game but 
who evaluates the plausibility of the options proposed in the game is important. 
Separating such SMEs from the efforts of any particular team helps to keep their 
judgments professional and objective, which can confer greater credibility on 
game outcomes.
Careful scenario design, with a clear idea of the purpose of a matrix game and the 
areas that the umpire wishes to explore, is critical. The game can be designed and 
used in the educational space, as a way of conveying to those less familiar with 
the topic essential truths about geography, stakeholders, and potential strategies.
However, matrix games also can be used to identify and analyze previously 
unanticipated potential future paths. The dynamic nature of these games seems 
to encourage the generation of unexpected insights. If analysts want to identify 
the most likely developments in a crisis, these can be reasoned out in a structured 
discussion; but if they want to explore other potential narrative routes, then a 
well-managed matrix game can be a useful tool.
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